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DOES ‘BEST PRACTICE’ IN SETTING EXECUTIVE PAY 
IN THE UK ENCOURAGE ‘GOOD’ BEHAVIOUR? 
Abstract: 
We examine how UK listed companies set executive pay, reviewing the implications of 
following best practice in corporate governance and examining how this can conflict with 
what shareholders and other stakeholders might perceive as good behaviour.  We do this 
by considering current governance regulation in the light of interviews with protagonists 
in the debate, setting out the dilemmas faced by remuneration-setters, and showing how 
the processes they follow can lead to ethical conflicts.  
 
Current ‘best’ practice governing executive pay includes the use of market benchmarks to 
determine salary and bonus levels, significant levels of performance-related pay, the 
desire for executives to hold equity in their companies, the disclosure of total shareholder 
return compared to an index, and a perceived need for conformity, in order to grant 
legitimacy to policies.  Whilst each of these may in some circumstances lead to good 
practice, each has the potential to cause dysfunctional behaviour in executives. 
 
Overall, we conclude that although best practice might drive good executive behaviour, 
that coincides with the company’s and key stakeholders’ objectives, there are many 
reasons why it should not.  
Keywords:  compensation, ethics, executive, governance, remuneration, stakeholder 
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DOES ‘BEST PRACTICE’ IN SETTING EXECUTIVE PAY 
IN THE UK ENCOURAGE ‘GOOD’ BEHAVIOUR? 
For more than a decade, executive compensation in the United Kingdom (UK), United 
States (US) and other jurisdictions has attracted unfavourable attention from practitioners, 
academics and the media, who have focused on the large amounts received by executives, 
both in absolute terms and in comparison with pay received by employees lower down 
the corporate hierarchy.  Much of this commentary is about whether the level of pay is 
‘fair’, either to employees or to shareholders, who see high executive rewards even when 
share price performance is poor.   
 
Partly as a result of this attention, the area has been subject to continued regulation, with 
government directives and voluntary codes focusing on the nature of pay and its 
disclosure.  In recent years, regulation in the UK has attempted to address these concerns 
by demanding that companies increase the proportion of pay that is performance-related 
rather than fixed salary, and by increasing the level of disclosure of executive reward.  
This regulation commenced with the Greenbury Report (1995) and is seen most recently 
in the Combined Code (2003).  However, despite these layers of regulation, we do not 
know whether the way in which executive pay is set addresses issues of ‘fairness’ nor, 
more broadly, how this might impact the behaviour of executive directorsi. 
 
This paper asks whether the pay practices, in particular the way that pay is determined, 
that are regarded as comprising good governance encourage good behaviour.  In order to 
address this question, a view must be taken as to what behaviour is in fact required;  in 
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other words, what ‘good’ looks like.  We start from the point of view that good behaviour 
means that the remuneration scheme will encourage executives to act in ways that are 
most appropriate for the company’s circumstances.  To some extent, the determination of 
this depends upon the perspective taken of the firm, be it a shareholder perspective 
(Friedman, 1962) or a stakeholder one (e.g.  Evan and Freeman,  1992):  different 
stakeholders have different needs of the organisation.  Our way to resolve this is to refer 
to the OECD’s preamble to its Principles of Corporate Governance: 
Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s management, 
its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders.  …  Good corporate governance should 
provide proper incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that are in 
the interests of the company and its shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring.  
(OECD, 2004:  11) 
 
It can be seen that although other stakeholders are considered, the OECD definition 
clearly privileges the shareholder.  Thus, as Wilhelm (1993:  469) states, the best 
remuneration schemes should reward executives for making decisions in the best interests 
of shareholders.  Accordingly, in this paper we focus largely on the shareholder, and see 
‘good’ in that light.  However, given the forthcoming changes to UK company law 
(Company Law Reform Bill, 2005, 10 (2) (156)) relating to ‘enlightened shareholder 
value’, which states that directors should also have regard to the interests of other 
stakeholders, we do also make reference to how these governance practices can affect 
other stakeholders. 
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The literature on executive pay (reviewed, for example, by Merchant et al., 2003;  
Werner and Ward, 2004)  mostly focuses on pay as an agency issue, in which 
remuneration contracts are designed to align executives’ and shareholders’ interests, 
although some social-psychological issues such as social comparison are researched 
(O'Reilly et al., 1988).  However, these are to some extent static analyses:  they use 
archival data to examine the outcomes of the remuneration-setting process, but not the 
processes themselves.  Indeed, the extant literature contains few papers (for example:  
McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999;  Pye, 2001;  Roberts, McNulty, and Stiles, 2005;  Perkins 
and Hendry, 2005) that examine the processes undertaken by boards of directors.  
Accordingly, our motivation in writing this paper is to look at the processes behind the 
pay policies and packages, to understand the objectives of the protagonists in setting 
remuneration, and to highlight the factors that influence their decisions, and the outcomes 
that result. 
 
To address this issue, and to present an analysis of the impact of the current governance 
regime and the resulting behaviours it can drive, this paper draws upon the results of 
interview-based research with protagonists in the remuneration-setting decision in a 
selection of FTSE 350 companies based in the UK.  The aim of the interviews was to 
determine how pay levels and structures were determined, and the issues considered by 
the remuneration-setters.  The interviews covered the decisions made, and how these 
decisions were addressed, given the constraints of best practice and corporate governance 
regulation.  The results indicate that some of the practices commonly regarded as good 
governance may have an unfortunate side-effect of encouraging behaviour that is not 
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necessarily in the interests of the company or its stakeholders.  Thus we provide empirical 
evidence to address some of the questions raised, in a US context, by Matsumura and 
Shin (2005). 
 
There are many papers, by both academics and practitioners, that suggest how 
remuneration practices might be changed (for example, Lee, 2002;  Bebchuk and Fried, 
2004).  That is not the aim of this paper, and we do not venture into that territory.  Our 
contribution is to set out what is happening, given that little previous research has 
uncovered how pay is set and the behaviours it drives.  We address practice as is, and 
leave it to others to build upon these findings to recommend changes.   
 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows.  The next section briefly sets the context of 
recent developments in governance in the UK relating to executive directors’ pay.  We 
then describe the research approach, and the following sections describe how companies 
determine pay and how this is affected by considerations of best practice.  The final 
section concludes, discussing the relationship between best practice and good behaviour. 
 
Corporate Governance Requirements Regarding Executive Pay 
The field of governance in the UK has evolved considerably since the Cadbury Report in 
1992.  Many regulations have impacted on remuneration practices.  Current governance 
regulations specifically relating to executive remuneration include the Combined Code  
(2003) (“the Code”) and the Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations (Department of 
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Trade and Industry (“DTI”), 2002) (“the Report Regulations”).  As regards the Code, one 
section is particularly relevant to this paper: 
Levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract, retain and motivate directors of the 
quality required to run the company successfully, but a company should avoid paying more 
than is necessary for this purpose.  A significant proportion of executive directors’ 
remuneration should be structured so as to link rewards to corporate and individual 
performance.  (2003, B1) 
 
We note later in this paper the difficulties that companies have in determining pay that is 
sufficient to attract and retain directors, but not excessive. 
 
The Report Regulations extended the already considerable disclosure required by UK 
listed companies.  Key disclosures for the published remuneration report include:  
1. a statement of remuneration policy;  
2. details of remuneration committee membership and meetings;  
3. advisors to the remuneration committee;  
4. details of individual directors' service contracts;  
5. a five year performance graph;  
6. details and explanation of performance measures for long-term incentives; and 
7. details of individual directors' remuneration.  
Of these disclosures, items 5, 6 and 7 in particular are pertinent and are discussed in this 
paper. 
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Research approach 
The study reported in this paper examined how executive directors’ pay was determined 
in selected companies.  It adopted a multiple company case study approach as suggested 
by Yin (1994), with the unit of analysis being the company.  It is an exploratory study;  
an appropriate approach given the fact, as stated earlier, that there is little in the extant 
body of literature that discusses board and committee processes. 
 
The research method was to conduct face-to-face interviews (lasting on average an hour) 
with protagonists in the remuneration-setting decision.  40 interviews were conducted in 
all.  35 of these were at 12 FTSE 350 companies;  the five other interviews, to gain wider 
views of the process, and to confirm initial findings, included headhunters, an 
institutional representative and two focus groupsii.  The fieldwork was mainly carried out 
in 2002 and 2003.  Table 1 sets out the roles of the corporate participants and the number 
of respondents from each firmiii. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The case companies were selected in a variety of ways.  The first six were cold-called, 
the selection being made based on data obtained from the PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Corporate Register (a commercial database of companies and directors) dated June 2001.  
Companies 7 to 10 joined the study through contact, via one of the early interviewees, 
with a group of executive remuneration professionals in FTSE 100 companies.  
Interviews at companies 11 and 12 arose after one of the authors had presented some 
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early findings at a corporate governance conference (Bender, 2003).  The main criteria 
for selecting companies for the research were (a) that they appeared to follow the 
governance regulations laid down in the Code;  and (b) that their non-executive directors 
(NEDs) between them had experience of several different companies.  A further criterion 
was the desire to include some utilities in the sample, as utilities provide an interesting 
context to explore executive pay in the UK, for historical and commercial reasons.iv
 
The interviews were semi-structured, but wide-ranging.  An interview protocol was 
drawn up based on an extensive literature review, with the broad aim of establishing the 
processes by which the directors’ remuneration policies and packages were determined in 
the selected companies.  The focus was on the individual companies and what was done 
there, rather than asking interviewees to comment on best practice, although inevitably 
best practice was discussed.  The interview protocol was piloted at two companies 
(included in the 12), and was not changed for the larger study. 
 
In addition to the interviews, documentation such as remuneration committee meeting 
minutes and consultants’ reports was obtained from five of the companies (the others 
would not make such information available).  Furthermore, financial statements 
(including the published remuneration reports) were obtained for all companies for the 
previous, current and subsequent years.  These various forms of documentation were used 
before the meetings to set a context for individual discussion, and after the meetings to 
confirm, where possible, details of schemes and processes that had been discussed.  
Further detail on the research method is given in Bender (2004). 
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 Before setting out the results of the research, it is useful to put the study in context.  The 
participating companies were to some extent self-selecting.  About 50 companies were 
approached for the study; only 12 agreed to become involvedv.  It is reasonable to assume 
– both a priori and from later discussions with the interviewees – that the case companies 
became involved because they were interested in governance issues and believed that 
their own practices would stand up to research scrutiny.  Given the research approach, 
and the fact that there is no intention to generalise to an overall population from this 
work, that does not present a problem.  It is, however, important,  as the sample 
population can therefore be assumed to include only ‘good’ companies, and individuals 
who were trying to follow what they perceived as good practice.  For a discussion on the 
ethics of executive pay, this is a useful starting point.  
 
Stakeholders in the pay-setting decision 
UK listed companies have formally-constituted remuneration committees of NEDs to 
determine executive pay.  In all of the case companies, the committee membership 
generally drew on the advice and expertise of the HR support staff and the company 
secretary. However, the CEO and chairman were often in attendance at the committee 
meetings, and provided input into their agendas.  The contribution of these participants 
was considered important, as the view of the executives who lead the business is 
generally seen as critical in designing schemes to meet corporate strategy.  (This is 
considered good practice under the Code (2003,  B2).) 
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In determining executive pay, remuneration committees have to have regard to several 
different constituencies:  the board (representing the company), executives, shareholders 
and possibly others.  Although shareholders, particularly institutional shareholders, were 
considered pivotal in most of the companies, the level and structure of remuneration were 
set with a view to satisfying three specific stakeholders.  As one of the interviewees 
stated: 
What you’re trying to do here is to identify a solution that is right for three parties:  the 
investors, the company, and the managers.  And all the time, they are concerned with those 
three dimensions.  And if it isn't satisfactory to any one of those three, it's not satisfactory.  
There's no point in coming up with something which the company thinks is wonderful, the 
investors think is wonderful, which has no value to the directors. 
HR professional 
 
It was clear that these three stakeholders were considered in remuneration-setting in all 
the case companies, although in some more weight was given to the executives, and in 
some the shareholders were seen as key.  Under the Combined Code (2003, B2.4) 
shareholders should be invited specifically to approve all new long-term incentive 
schemes and significant changes to existing schemes.  Accordingly, there was formal and 
informal consultation with major shareholders and their representative bodies (the 
Association of British Insurers and the National Association of Pension Funds). 
 
Employees and customers are also stakeholders, and although they were not specifically 
consulted about executive pay, their likely views were sometimes considered.  For 
example, the remuneration practices and disclosures of utilities are governed by the UK’s 
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various utilities acts, which meant that all of the utilities in the in the sample had 
customer- and employee-related performance measures attached to their bonus awards. 
Furthermore, some interviewees referred to the way in which executive pay would be 
perceived by these stakeholders.   
You have in a remuneration structure to try and ensure that you've got fairness.  That’s 
fairness to the individual and fairness to the organisation.  And the organisation means all 
the constituent parts:  the customers, the other members of staff, and the shareholders. 
CEO (non-utility) 
Thus remuneration policies did appear in these case companies to take account of 
stakeholder interests, although this was not a universal approach. 
 
How best practice affects executive pay 
The interviewees discussed various ways in which ‘best practice’ affected pay levels and 
structures.  These included using market benchmarks to set pay and bonus levels;  the 
need to be fair, and to be seen to be fair to the various parties;  the ubiquitous use of 
performance-related pay;  the choice of performance measures and targets, including the 
use of total shareholder return (TSR) as a performance measure and the perceived need 
for conformance in determining pay policies;  and the requirement for executives to hold 
equity in their companies.  Each of these is discussed in turn.  
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The use of market benchmarks 
Although executive pay is perceived to be high as compared to that of the general 
population, it is impossible to state whether, generally, it is ‘too high’.  No clear, 
workable guidelines have ever been established to determine what levels of pay would be 
appropriate, even though several researchers have considered this subject.  For example, 
Cox and Power (1991) and Perel (2003) both report the attitudes of various stakeholders 
in the executive pay debate, but come to no conclusion.  Nichols and Subramaniam 
(2001) discuss the argument that executives are overpaid, and that the amount of such 
overpayment is increasing, and then compare that with the argument made by others, that 
executives are paid a fair amount.  They conclude that both viewpoints are unsatisfactory;  
over- or under-payment can only be judged in relation to others, and there is no clear 
standard for comparison.  Interestingly, Moriarty (2005) does set out a case for executives 
being overpaid, using a range of different comparators.  However, he fails to establish a 
basis to determine the ‘correct’ level of pay. 
 
In practice, pay is generally set with reference to sector-based remuneration surveys that 
measure companies on size, which sets a benchmark that can be justified to investors. 
 
Several issues arise from this use of market surveys to set pay.  In addition to the aspects 
of fairness, discussed next in this paper, are matters of the ratcheting up of pay, and the 
need to retain good executives.  These are all linked, as remuneration committees and 
their advisors appreciate the problems of ever-increasing pay levels, but worry about 
losing valuable employees.   
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When we look at salaries we look at base pay, and we're very careful to construct 
something that looks exactly competitive with our competitors.  …  once we do incentives 
we also do look at what the market is paying for equivalent jobs.  …  But we are saying to 
ourselves 'does this look right?'.  Because as I said before, our executives, male and 
female, always have the opportunity of taking something else, given their skills.  And 
certainly, comparability of the package is an important factor in that. 
Committee chairman 
 
This extract highlights one of the main worries of remuneration committees – that they 
may lose good people by paying below the market.  However, some authors believe the 
argument on retention to be overdone, in that executives paid less than the market are 
unlikely to leave.  For example, Wilhelm (1993:  480) comments that:  
… surveys are bogus and CEO mobility is really low.  Surveys presume that underpaid 
CEOs have many better-paying CEO jobs available to them.  Openings are in fact scarce 
and many CEOs wouldn’t be hired because their skills are limited mainly to one company 
or industry… 
 
The ratcheting up of executive pay (Hamilton, 1995;  Moules, 2004) has to a large extent 
been driven by that most important of governance principles – disclosure.  Following the 
Greenbury report (1995), which required companies to disclose the pay details for each 
director separately, individuals and companies had a clear benchmark.  Several 
interviewees expressed sentiments similar to the following. 
In my view, by far the biggest input on the steady increase in executive director pay over 
the last decade has been the Greenbury report.  Publication of directors' remuneration has 
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had an inevitable upward push on executive pay.  It would be interesting to know how many 
of your remuneration committees were prepared to say that they would aim their target 
remuneration in the bottom quartile. 
Headhunter 
Such an increase in pay resulting from disclosure is in line with the observations of 
Matsumura and Shin (2005), who commented, in a US context, that although additional 
disclosures could mean improved governance, they could also lead to a “beauty contest” 
in which levels of compensation increased as firms desired their executives to be amongst 
the highest paid. 
 
The level of total pay also reflects the amount of bonus earned and the long-term award, 
and these too have been increasing in recent years, following the market up in the same 
way as has salary.  The following comment is representative. 
The reason we went from 40% to 60% [bonus cap] was because we were advised by 
[consultancy] that that was what the typical market company was doing.  And therefore we 
just thought that we were falling in line with market practice.  And I think that was true. 
Committee chairman 
 
This increase in variable pay levels has a multiplier effect on the overall package.   
 
Many of the interviewees did comment that compensation was ‘too high’, although none 
could suggest a mechanism to reduce the acceleration of executive pay, and none was 
willing to be the first company to put the brakes on.  There was, however, one exception 
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to this.  In one company, in one year, the CEO prevented the remuneration committee 
from implementing a survey-based pay rise that he thought (based partly on a conscious 
regard to the ongoing political debate about executive pay) was too high.  Instead, he took 
soundings from colleagues at other companies, and concluded that a general inflation 
increase would be more appropriate than the sums suggested by the surveys. 
 
Overall, the participants were well aware of the problems caused by continually 
increasing levels of executive pay, and understood that the market comparisons and full 
disclosure were at least in part a cause of this.  However, they were unable or unwilling to 
take action to limit the rise in executive salaries and bonuses, for fear of losing valuable 
employees.  Using the language of the Code (2003, B1), pay levels were set to attract and 
retain directors, but it was difficult to establish what level would be “more than is 
necessary”. 
 
The need for fairness 
Related to the above is the need for fairness in setting remuneration at senior levels.  
Executive pay has to be fair both to the executives and also to the shareholders to whom 
belong the company’s residual profits:  excessive remuneration reduces these profits.  As 
an example of the latter, in one company the executive bonus was reduced by the 
remuneration committee, despite the targets being met, because a poor acquisition had led 
to an erosion of shareholder value, and the committee took the view that it was 
appropriate that the executives share the shareholders’ loss.vi  However, overall, fairness 
to the executives featured more in our interviews than fairness to shareholders. 
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 As Bloom (2004) points out with regard to employees in general, fairness may be critical 
to a well-designed compensation scheme.  Bloom suggests several criteria for fairness, 
including fair pay for fair work (with better performers receiving more), and procedural 
fairness in allocating pay between employees.  He notes that compensation systems “may 
also be important signals of the values, morals, and virtues upon which the organization 
operates” (2004:  150).  The interviewees in this study reflected Bloom’s view of the 
many aspects of fairness, referring separately to three ways in which the executive 
compensation needed to be fair, as set out below. 
 
(a) Fairness between different executives in the same company 
One aspect of fairness related to principles of distributive and procedural justice (Adams, 
1963;  Bloom, 2004).  The pay differential between members of the executive 
management team has to be perceived as fair, and performance-related pay has to go to 
those who perform well, in order to differentiate the contributions of managers.   
One, we actually wanted to ensure that we did introduce this element of variable pay to 
incentivise people, and therefore we wanted to ensure that we paid everybody a fair rate for 
the job, but that those who achieved most had the ability to increase their reward. 
HR professional 
This sentiment, that fair pay would reflect the differing contributions of individuals, was 
expressed by several of the interviewees. 
 
(b) Fairness between executives and their peers in comparable companies   
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Equity theory (Adams, 1963) suggests that the managers compare their roles and 
contributions, and their pay, with those of their peers, and will be satisfied if the ratios of 
work inputs to pay outcomes are about the same.  Remuneration-setters were very 
conscious of this need for comparability, both in levels of pay (as evidenced by the 
universal use of remuneration surveys) and in the ability to generate large bonuses 
through performance-related elements. 
What [he] wants and expects is to be paid fairly.  He would regard being paid fairly in two 
ways.  One, that the basic amount he gets is reasonably comparable with those that he 
regards as his peers outside.  And the second thing he'd expect is that if he and the 
company perform better, he gets paid more.  Now that is what he would regard as being 
treated fairly.  So if he didn't get that he would regard himself as being treated unfairly.   
HR professional 
 
This was elegantly summed up by one CEO: 
If salaries for the average FTSE chief executive were half as much, then relative to each 
other, they would still be more concerned about that relativity than they would about 
whether it's half. 
CEO 
This links back to the use of executive pay surveys discussed earlier.  It highlights the 
fact that fairness in pay is defined in a relative manner, rather than as an absolute. 
 
(c) Fairness between executives and workers lower down the hierarchy  
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Although the pay multiple between executives and other employees is the focus of much 
external comment (for example Moules, 2004), interviewees varied in their attitudes to 
how much this mattered. 
 
One interviewee had strong views about the need to consider pay rates throughout the 
company: 
Every statement talks about people being our most important asset, etc.  It's about time the 
feet followed the words, quite frankly.  In this company our executive pay is probably 8 to 9 
times the average pay in the company.  I think that’s probably justifiable, maybe about right.  
But when you get to the kinds of levels that you're talking about in some companies, how 
are you going to motivate people to feel part of the team, part of the enterprise, something 
you can actually relate to and invest your discretionary effort in?  Because that's what 
you're trying to capture in the way you manage people.  It's giving the extra bit of effort. 
HR professional 
However, such remarks were not common, and it was more usual for interviewees to 
comment that the pay differential through the organisation was not a matter for the 
committee to consider.  This was explained by one committee chairman as follows. 
Oh, I don't think we've got those sort of formula [relating executive pay to average or 
minimum wages] in place.  Because I think the top end is driven by assessment of what the 
market would pay for that post, and probably the next 50 posts below that are also market 
related.  The bottom end is related to the annual pay round, and that's mainly inflation 
linked rather than comparator linked.  And then the bits in the middle get sorted out in a 
similar way.  But we do obviously - one of the debates we had when we were setting 
[CEO’s] salary last year was how is this going to be viewed by the guy [working on the 
shopfloor]?  Can we justify it to him?  That was very much in the conversation.  So it's 
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certainly not done in isolation.  But the top is driven by market forces and the bottom end is 
driven by national pay and conditions, which are going on at the time. 
Committee chairman 
 
In the light of the earlier discussion on the need to retain good executives, such comments 
are understandable, even if they have led to the disassociation of executive pay levels 
from those of other employees.  In the discussion of fairness, perceived commercial 
imperatives meant that fairness between different hierarchical levels of the company was 
regarded as less significant than fairness to executives and shareholders. 
 
The use of performance-related pay 
As discussed earlier, executive remuneration in the UK generally comprises a base salary 
plus both short- and long-term performance-related elements (New Bridge Street, 2004a, 
2004b).  The short-term element, normally an annual bonus scheme, will often include 
both corporate and individual performance targets.  The longer-term elements might 
include a share option scheme or another form of long-term incentive plan (‘ltip’), often 
using restricted shares.  In addition, executives might receive perks and a pension.  The 
research focus was on the salary, bonus and long-term remuneration; in common with 
much other research in this field (e.g. Murphy, 1999:  2517; Werner and Ward, 2004:  
217), little attention was paid to perks and pensions. 
 
The use of performance-related pay (PRP) is ubiquitous in UK listed companies (New 
Bridge Street, 2004a,2004b).  Various reasons are given for this (Bender, 2004), 
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including the desire to motivate performance, the need to be fair to employees, good HR 
practice, and the need for corporate legitimacy.  But does PRP encourage good 
behaviour? 
 
Frey and Osterloh (2005) argue persuasively that using a high level of PRP results in 
managers acting selfishly and against the shareholders’ interests.  Citing Enron, 
WorldCom, etc, they suggest that PRP is one factor that has caused some of the corporate 
frauds and excesses of recent times.  They argue that companies should focus on 
intrinsically motivated corporate virtue rather than relying on externally-provided 
incentives. 
 
A quote from one of the interviewees, whilst not typical of other conversations, illustrates 
a problem of such variable pay: 
Human nature is very variable from individual to individual.  So how they work differently, at 
its worst, will be people become overly obsessed with what their reward is and what is 
required to deliver that.  And that might not always be in the best interests of the 
organisation as a whole.  And the obvious example of that -- well, there's several of them -- 
but in retail you fight for floorspace.  And you might wish to have more floorspace than 
somebody else so as to deliver your sales targets, even though somebody else might get a 
better return from it.  The other one that's common, I'm not saying that it happens a lot 
here, but I'm sure it did a bit last year, is that if you're well in excess of your target coming 
up to year-end then you might as well bring forward some of your costs and spend some 
money, which of course depresses the overall profit but still means your area is okay.  By 
depressing the overall profit you can actually have an adverse effect on somebody else.   
Company secretary 
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 As stated, such comments about PRP were rare, and indeed, that interviewee went on to 
discuss his belief that most individuals do see the wider picture, to benefit the 
organisation. 
 
One finding of the research was that remuneration packages and policies are often 
changed, particularly if the PRP elements do not pay out, or pay out too little (Bender, 
2005).  An argument made to justify this follows expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964;  
Lawler, 1991), which maintains that PRP will only motivate if (a) the employee sees the 
amount to be earned as worthwhile, (b) believes that the award will be paid if the targets 
are achieved, and (c) considers those targets to be achievable.  The research findings 
showed instances of changes to pay schemes for both (a) and (c), with the amount of 
potential reward being increased, and measures or targets being amended if they were 
unlikely to be met.   
 
One HR professional justified such changes with the comment that: 
The committee decided that to have something that frankly was not incentivising was a 
weak and blunt instrument. 
In the same vein, the minutes for another company noted that:  
… the committee was of the view that the restricted share plan in its present form was not 
incentivising… 
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In both companies the schemes were subsequently changed.  Whilst this makes sense 
from a motivational viewpoint, it could create a moral hazard if employees come to 
expect that under-performing will lead to targets being restated.   
 
An issue relating to this changing of schemes and targets is the re-pricing of share options 
that are underwater.  This practice is not common in the UK, and of all the interviewees, 
only one was fully in favour of re-pricing;  the rest were mostly against.  However, as 
these out-of-the-money options were often supplemented by the issue of new share 
options at the lower current price, there is a strong argument that this too can create a 
moral hazard, as the executives end up holding the new, cheaper options as well as the 
originals (Arya and Sun, 2004). 
 
Measuring and reporting total shareholder return  
A commonly-used performance measure for ltips is total shareholder return (TSR).  This 
measures the return to shareholders over a fixed period (commonly three years) and 
compares this to the TSR from a group of comparable companies, or an index.  Normally, 
if a company earns TSR lower than the median of its group, the ltip shares will not vest;  
vesting is in proportion to the company’s position on a TSR ranking, with full vesting for 
upper quartile performance.   
 
A problem with TSR is that the company may be at the mercy of market sentiment, 
particularly if it benchmarks against an index such as the FTSE 100 and is in an out-of-
favour sector.  Also, share prices can move for reasons unconnected with the directors’ or 
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company’s performance:  one HR director complained that although his company’s share 
price had risen on the delivery of their own good results, it had then fallen because a 
competitor released bad news into the market.  This had no effect on his company’s 
performance, but did affect their TSR.   
 
The interviewees were very aware of this problem, and commented that this performance 
measure, the use of which is often seen as good governance because it reflects what the 
shareholders receive, can be de-motivating for executives who may have little control 
over it.  One consultant reflected other interviewees in his comment: 
But the longer you go out, I think the less sharp an incentive it is.  Particularly when it’s 
share price, there are so many different factors that are going to influence what the share 
price does. 
Consultant 
 
Another impact of TSR, not directly commented upon by any interviewee, is that the 
reverse can happen, and executives can receive an undeserved reward.  For example, 
when Philip Purcell left his job as Morgan Stanley's chief executive the share price rose 
significantly (Partnoy, 2005):  he would be able to sell his shares at a greater profit, solely 
because the market was pleased by the change of management. 
 
A further problem with TSR is that it is complex to calculate.  This has two impacts.  One 
is an HR problem in that it can be difficult to motivate executives based on a measure 
they do not fully understand, and against which they cannot easily determine progress.  
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Also, the TSR figures can be manipulated.  Such manipulation can be in two ways.  One 
NED, an ex finance director himself, pointed out that the company executives could time 
when to issue news to the market to guide expectations, thus managing the share price at 
the margin (as discussed by Aboody and Kasznik, 2000).  And a consultant pointed out 
that the calculation of TSR can be done in various ways (e.g. spot prices or average 
prices) to lead to different results.  (In fairness, that consultant also pointed out that his 
firm does not revise the TSR calculation methodology to suit executives’ wishes.) 
 
Thus an apparently objective measure, theoretically aligned with value for shareholders, 
may not be as useful as it first appears. 
 
Jensen (2004) writes about the agency costs of overvalued equity and points out that 
executives whose shares are overvalued have an incentive to defend that unrealistic share 
price, which can lead to fraud or bad practices.  Compensation that is based in any way 
on the share price (including share options) will only exacerbate this. 
 
A further point on TSR is relevant.  The Report Regulations (DTI, 2002) demand that 
companies disclose a chart showing the TSR of the company over a five year period 
against the TSR of an appropriate index (e.g. the FTSE 100).  Although such disclosure is 
useful to investors, in practice there could be an adverse effect.  Although the graph is for 
a five year period (which sits oddly with the reality that most companies’ long-term 
schemes are for three years), a new graph will be produced each year, for the preceding 
five years.  Thus it is not necessarily the company’s long term shareholder value that is 
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being managed but, possibly, its short term share price, with the need to show a 
satisfactory chart each year.   
 
Even if there were no need to display a chart, this problem might still exist.  Best practice 
is to make a new award every year under the long-term scheme (options or ltips).  This 
makes good sense, as it averages out movements in a cyclical business, and provides a 
‘handcuff’ to retain executives who always have two years’ incentives to come.  
Nevertheless, it means that a three-year period ends each year, with the incentive to 
manage the year’s performance to trigger vesting of each separate award. 
 
Performance measures:  disclosure and conformity 
An agency theory approach (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) implies that managers will 
strive to meet the relevant performance criteria in order to achieve additional reward.  
Many (for example Davis et al., 1997;  McConvill, 2005) would argue with this basic 
premise, taking exception to the one-dimensional view of Economic Man driven only by 
financial reward.  We have great sympathy with these views.  However, given the reality 
that much of the regulation surrounding executive remuneration appears to be driven by 
an agency theory approach, we ground our analysis in that school of thought. 
 
In order for performance-related pay to be beneficial to the company, the performance 
criteria must be valid.  This means, in particular, that the measures must be suitable for 
the business, and the targets must be appropriate to the corporate goals.  Measures that 
are mis-aligned will lead to executives acting in a way that does not add value;  targets 
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that are too low will not enhance performance, and those that are unrealistically high will 
demotivate.  Thus, setting appropriate measures and targets is one of the most challenging 
aspects of pay design (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997). 
 
The interviewees were aware of these issues, and many commented on the need to 
balance short and long term incentives, and to balance financial and non-financial 
measures. 
 
There are two particular issues peculiar to the design of executive incentives that relate to 
best practice in corporate governance:  the need for disclosure of performance measures;  
and the desire for conformity, to establish the legitimacy of a remuneration policy. 
 
The Report Regulations (DTI, 2002) state that details must be given of performance 
measures and targets relating to share options or other long-term incentive schemes.  
Such details should include an explanation of why these conditions were chosen and 
methods of assessing performance against these conditions.  Furthermore, the Combined 
Code (2003:  B2.4) states that companies must obtain the agreement of investors for their 
long term incentive schemes, which means that a dialogue will be entered into with key 
shareholder and institutional bodies.   
 
This disclosure of performance measures and targets represents good governance 
practice, and has many advantages for investors. For example, Buckley (2004) discusses 
how J. Sainsbury, a UK supermarket chain, withdrew its chairman’s bonus because 
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investors argued that the underlying targets were insufficiently stretching.  Without 
sufficient disclosure, this institutional action might have been less effective. 
 
However, such disclosure can have unexpected consequences.  One case company was 
reluctant to link measures and targets very closely with the corporate strategic plan.  They 
argued that although such linkage could be good for performance, confidentiality 
concerns meant that they were not prepared to share this information with shareholders, 
and so could not use the measures. 
 
Another aspect of the institutional interest in performance measures came in discussions 
at one company about a pending change to a scheme.  Previous years’ bonus measures 
had included a subjective assessment by the remuneration committee as to how well the 
executives had done in the round.  This was being changed, replaced with more objective 
measures.  An interviewee suggested that the changes were not necessarily to the benefit 
of the company, but done in order to increase the legitimacy of the plan in the eyes of 
‘box tickers’ in the institutions.   
 
This perceived preference for ‘hard’ measures is also shown in the reluctance of some 
companies to use broader measures of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in executive 
pay.  Although all of the utilities had such measures (as mentioned earlier, they are 
required to do so under the utilities acts), some other companies chose only to measure 
financials.  In a discussion with the HR manager of a company which appeared to have a 
strong (unmeasured) CSR ethos, the following explanation was given for this. 
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It hasn't come up as a common discussion point in terms of moving towards some form of 
balanced scorecard.  I think one of the reasons is that there is a lot of scepticism within and 
without the company in terms of valid measurement and calibration.  And in many ways the 
pressures that are being put on remuneration committees in order to only pay for 
performance would mean that you actually probably want schemes where there is as little 
discretion as possible.  And with those sort of plans, unless you begin to start seriously 
measuring intangibles, which you can do of course....  Let's say that you'd wanted to 
recognise that we’d introduced a major board committee for corporate social responsibility, 
and that the board itself ought to have 20 percent of its annual incentive reward on how we 
do against these measures.  We’d then have to define the measures, get agreement on 
them, calibrate them.  And then if they are not clearly quantifiable have a way of working 
out how well people have done. 
HR professional 
 
It is thus possible that the design of executive pay schemes means that CSR issues are 
being side-lined in some companies;  good governance practice leading to an outcome 
that many stakeholders might find undesirable. 
 
Surveys by New Bridge Street (2004a, 2004b) show how similar performance measures 
are throughout the FTSE 350.  One question asked of all the interviewees in this study 
was whether, if they found a measure that was perfect for the company but totally unique, 
they would use it for their executive remuneration packages.  Many were nervous of such 
novelty as it would be difficult to explain to the remuneration committee (by the HR 
professionals) and to the institutions (by the committee).  Indeed, an institutional 
representative commented that they would be suspicious of any new measures – “there’s 
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an instinctive tendency to mistrust new measures and then to analyse them away until 
they resemble more traditional schemes”.  The following comment is typical. 
Well I think we would...  I'm just thinking about the committee, and how it responds to 
innovation.  I think the committee would be prepared to consider, I'm not saying we'd 
necessarily do it.  But I think we'd look.  It would need to be something very special, clearly.  
And something which I felt that we could actually go to the City and explain and they would 
find acceptable.  But I would have thought that there's a lot of companies out there, and if 
there were these sort of novel things around, people would have thought of them by now. 
Company chairman 
 
Thus it can be seen that at the executive director level performance measures may be 
chosen that are not necessarily the most appropriate to meet the company’s objectives, 
but do confer legitimacy and avoid disclosure of sensitive information. 
 
In addition to determining the proportion of directors’ remuneration that is to be 
performance-related, and the measures to use, remuneration committees need to ensure 
performance targets  are set that will motivate directors towards desired performance.  
This is not always easy:  many studies (e.g. Healy, 1985; Murphy, 2001) indicate that 
performance targets may be gamed, and so not achieve their desired outcomes.  
Furthermore, Jensen (2003) gives examples of how paying people for budget-based 
targets can lead to false budgets and poor business decisions.  Although most 
interviewees stated that this did not happen in their companies, one did suggest that there 
might be an impact. 
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So when the operating plan is set, you will end with, in very loose terms, a profit target for 
the year end.  And that profit target will be the one against which your achieved level of 
bonus will be, and then there will be a sliding scale up from that, in excess of that.  So there 
is a disincentive to have too stretching a profit target, because it will very quickly be 
potentially demotivating if you know you've not hit it.  But it does mean that if you just took 
away all thoughts of reward, if suddenly you could change somebody's mind and say I only 
want to operate for the good of the company and the shareholders, then I'm not sure you'd 
come up with exactly the same operating plan. 
Company secretary 
 
A further issue as regards performance targets mirrors the fact mentioned earlier that 
many companies have the same performance measures.  Many also have the same targets, 
for example as regards growth in earnings per share as a measure attached to the vesting 
of share options (New Bridge Street Consultants, 2004b).  Such similarity of targets is 
inappropriate given that companies face different growth conditions and different stock 
market expectations.  Often, merely achieving the targets set will not add value for 
shareholders (Conyon et al., 2000:  494) despite the fact that the company appears to be 
following best practice. 
 
Executive shareholdings 
One of the arguments of agency theory is that share ownership by the executives can 
reduce the underlying agency problem.  This is borne out in studies such as those by 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) or Morck et al. (1988), both of whom find that, up to a 
certain level, company performance increases with executive share ownership.  Thus 
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executive share ownership is widely seen as a good thing.  In line with this approach, the 
Combined Code (2003, Schedule A) encourages the holding of company shares by 
executives, and it is becoming common for companies to devise ways of facilitating this.  
Of the 12 case companies, four had definite rules for executive shareholdings (for 
example, that the CEO should hold shares valued at at least twice his/her salary) and two 
had a voluntary guideline.  
 
In nine companies an element of the annual bonus had to be deferred into shares in the 
company, which would vest in two or three years, often with the company adding a 
matching number of shares if certain performance targets were met.  This too was 
designed to align executives with shareholders: 
We felt that that would demonstrate externally a much stronger commitment to the business 
if you had to invest in the first place into it. 
HR professional 
 
Although both types of scheme result in the executives holding shares it is interesting to 
note that they have different shapes and can led to different outcomes.  One remuneration 
consultant summed this up when discussing a share-match scheme: 
And the last one was to put in an arrangement which encouraged people, in fact required 
people to invest some of their bonus in the company's shares.  And that gave them a better 
alignment with shareholders, but gave them an awful lot of upside if they did well with the  
business. 
Consultant 
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 Because the share match can lead to a much greater shareholding, theory suggests that it 
should provide a greater incentive, and it might give executives more of an incentive to 
take risks than would the simple ownership of shares.  This may in some instances be 
seen as a good thing.  Shareholders (although not other stakeholders such as employees) 
quite often want executives to take risks, to complement their own diversified investment 
strategies.   
 
However, financial theory suggests that it is illogical to demand that executives, with 
undiversified jobs, hold a great part of their wealth tied up in their own companies.  
Although this does appear to align them with shareholders, to quote one interviewee, “no 
sane investment advisor would suggest that at all”.  An executive in a failing company, 
whose personal wealth was significantly tied to that company’s share price performance, 
may have an incentive to distort results:  the example of Bernie Ebbers at WorldCom may 
illustrate this (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003;  Sonnenfeld, 2004). 
 
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier when discussing TSR, executives have the ability to 
manipulate share price at the margin.  They are also able to time share awards or option 
exercises to benefit their own personal wealth.  For example, Yermack (1997) found, in a 
US study, that option awards were timed to coincide with favourable movements in stock 
prices.  Thus schemes which are designed to award shares or options to executives, with 
the aim of increasing their shareholdings, can be gamed. 
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Discussion and conclusions:  Does best practice encourage good behaviour?  
This paper addresses the issue of how setting executive pay in accordance with good 
governance practice can influence the executives’ behaviour, either for good or 
otherwise.  It does this by presenting the results of interview-based research with 40 
participants, representing 12 FTSE 350 companies and some other protagonists in the 
executive pay debate in the UK.  The nature of the research is such that the companies 
and interviewees only agreed to participate if they had an interest in corporate 
governance, the implication being that those concerned believe their governance practices 
to be good.  Accordingly, the research results are not, and were never intended to be, 
generalisable to a wider population, but they do show how ‘best practice’ has been 
operationalised in specific companies. 
 
This paper builds on a vast body of statistical research in the field, and adds to the body 
of knowledge by providing a rich insight into the executive remuneration-setting process, 
showing in detail the considerations that remuneration committees need to address and 
the problems they face.   
 
Best practice in setting executive pay requires market benchmarking of pay levels, a 
significant performance-related element in the pay structure, objective performance 
measures, and substantial disclosure.  These structures have all been adopted for valid 
reasons, to encourage transparency in this critical area of corporate governance, and to 
align executive behaviour with the needs of the company.  But the findings of this 
research indicate that these practices, whilst no doubt addressing some problems with 
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governance, have also led to a continued upward ratchet in pay, and pay structures and 
performance measures that can be gamed, and may have less to do with a company’s 
strategic objectives than with gaining legitimacy in the eyes of key stakeholders.   
 
Good behaviour means that the remuneration scheme will drive behaviour that meets the 
needs of the stakeholders in the most appropriate way for the company’s circumstances.  
It further implies that the behaviours that the scheme is trying to influence will in fact 
deliver the outcomes sought.  In practice, in this paper, ‘good’ behaviour mainly 
addresses the needs of shareholders, although other direct stakeholders (e.g. employees 
and customers) are considered.   
 
The findings of this research show that the process by which board remuneration is set 
has been driven by corporate governance requirements.  As such there is the risk that 
remuneration becomes homogenised in order to be legitimate and that there is little focus 
on the specific objectives on the firm.  Further, companies with a desire to act for the 
benefit of a wider range of stakeholders may be constrained by the need to adopt 
recognisable performance measures rather than specifically-tailored CSR measures. 
 
‘Long term’ schemes generally run for only three years, often less than a complete 
business cycle.  This is compounded by the fact that a new long term incentive is awarded 
every year, and performance graphs are produced for each five-year period, which means 
that the long term focus can in fact be compromised by the need to reach a series of short 
term goals.  The focus on performance-related pay can lead to an unhealthy focus on the 
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share price or profits, as can the requirement for executives to hold a proportion of their 
wealth in their own companies, thus limiting their diversification opportunities and 
increasing their personal risk.   
 
There remains the issue of whether the total level of pay is fair, and to whom.  Fairness is 
a relative term, rather than an absolute:  there is no correct number for executive pay. We 
found that in practice, ‘fairness’ mostly means fairness to the executive in comparison to 
his/her peers – this drives the amount needed to pay what it takes to get and retain the 
right individual.  Thus a purported market seems to determine the remuneration level – 
whether or not society agrees that this is fair.   
 
Many of the recent developments in corporate governance have been introduced to drive 
out certain bad behaviours – yet this does not guarantee ‘good’ behaviour.  Compliance 
with regulation does not ensure an ethical approach, and even a well-intentioned scheme 
can result in dysfunctional behaviour by executives.  Indeed, one of the interviewees 
referred to an effective performance-related pay system as the equivalent of the Holy 
Grail – something much sought-after but not yet found. 
 
This study does not find evidence that current practice in corporate governance always 
drives bad behaviour;  but it does show that the system results in incentives that could 
lead executives towards behaviours that are not in the interests of shareholders or other 
stakeholders.   In summary, we conclude that best practice might drive good behaviour, 
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but strict adherence to an ever-increasing range of governance regulations means that this 
relationship should not be taken for granted. 
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CEO  Chief Executive Officer 
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Table 1  Company interviewees by job description 
 
 
Co 
HR (human 
resources) 
Professional 
Committee 
chairman 
Non-
Exec. 
Director 
 
Consultant 
 
CEO 
Company 
secretary 
Company 
chairman 
 
Total 
1 2 1 1 1 1   6 
2 1 1 1 1 1   5 
3 1       1 
4 1 1   1   3 
5 1  1 1  1 1 5 
6 2       2 
7 1 1 2 1 1 1  7 
8 1   1    2 
9 1       1 
10 1       1 
11      1  1 
12  1      1 
Total 12 5 5 5 4 3 1 35 
 
Of the case companies, nine were from the FTSE 100 and three were FTSE 250. 
 
                                                 
i As this paper refers to UK legislation, the word ‘director’ on its own is used synonymously with 
‘executive’.  Outside directors are known as ‘non-executive directors’ 
ii The interviews were focused around the following questions:  (A)  Your thoughts on the debate about the 
level and structure of executive directors’ remuneration  (6 questions addressing issues of level and 
structure, performance and motivation);   (B)  How the company arrived at its remuneration policies  (11 
questions addressing the conduct of committee meetings, the roles of the different parties, matters 
considered and then rejected, time lines of decisions, comparative pay throughout the organisation);  and 
(C)  How the company’s remuneration policies compare to other companies of which you are aware  (3 
questions addressing level and structure of pay, and ‘good’ or ‘bad’ practice).  Interviewees were also asked 
to complete a short questionnaire, ranking the various factors that might impact on their pay decisions (e.g.  
company size, profitability, strategy, individual director needs, etc.) 
iii Eisenhardt (1989) states that in case study research, where the focus is on understanding the dynamics 
present in single settings, there is no ideal number of cases for a study (such as there might be in statistical 
analysis), but that a number between four and ten usually works well. 
iv It was primarily the generous packages awarded to directors of the newly-privatised utilities that led to 
the setting up on the Greenbury study group, which produced its influential report on directors’ 
remuneration in 1995.  Utility directors suffered at that time from the ‘fat cat’ label, although much has 
changed in the sector since then.  Furthermore, current legislation governing the utilities demands that they 
disclose how (if at all) executive remuneration is linked to operational service standards, the aim being to 
encourage such a link.  Four utilities were included in the 12 case companies.  The utility interviewees were 
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very aware of their companies’ ‘fat cat’ history, but otherwise there were no other differences between the 
utilities and other case companies. 
v The exact number of companies approached is unknown to the authors, as the group of remuneration 
professionals was circularised by the interviewee contact and we had no access to their details.  25 
companies were contacted directly by the researchers. 
vi One could of course argue that any scheme that was due to pay out despite such an erosion of shareholder 
value was poorly designed anyway.  However, that is not the focus of this paper. 
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